Social influence preserves cooperative strategies in the conditional cooperator public goods game on a multiplex network by Allen, James M et al.
Social influence preserves cooperative strategies in the
conditional cooperator public goods game on a multiplex network
James M. Allen∗
Department of Mathematics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK. and
Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3EJ, UK.
Anne C. Skeldon†
Department of Mathematics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK.
Rebecca B. Hoyle‡
Mathematical Sciences, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK.
(Dated: October 24, 2018)
Numerous empirical studies show that when people play social dilemma games in
the laboratory they often cooperate conditionally, and the frequency of conditional
cooperators differs between communities. However, this has not yet been fully-
explained by social dilemma models in structured populations. Here we model a
population as a two-layer multiplex network, where the two layers represent economic
and social interactions respectively. Players play a conditional public goods game on
the economic layer, their donations to the public good dependent on the donations
of their neighbours, and player strategies evolve through a combination of payoff
comparison and social influence. We find that both conditional cooperation and
social influence lead to increased cooperation in the public goods game, with social
influence being the dominant factor. Cooperation is more prevalent both because
conditional cooperators are less easily exploited by free-riders than unconditional
cooperators, and also because social influence tends to preserve strategies over time.
Interestingly the choice of social imitation rule does not appear to be important: it
is rather the separation of strategy imitation from payoff comparison that matters.
Our results highlight the importance of social influence in maintaining cooperative
behaviour across populations, and suggest that social behaviour is more important
than economic incentives for the maintenance of cooperation.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
Many important issues can be framed as social dilemmas, or tensions between actions that
favour the interests of the individual (‘defection’ or ‘free-riding’) and those that favour the
group (‘cooperation’). Game theory is often used to analyse the prevalence of cooperation
in social and biological systems [1, 2], and in particular in social dilemmas [3] including
common fisheries [4] and water sources [5]. In standard one-shot social dilemma games
players typically choose from two distinct strategies: cooperate or defect. Previous analyses
of one-shot games in unstructured populations find that defection dominates the population
[6], a result that is at odds with the cooperation widely observed in both social and biological
systems [7].
Numerical simulations of single networked populations [8] have been extensively used to
examine the reasons that cooperation persists. These networks represent player interactions:
network nodes describe players and network edges describe the connections between them.
Combinations of networks are also studied, including multiple networks with edges formed
between them (interdependent) [9] and multilayered networks where ties between nodes are
not necessarily the same on each layer (multiplexes) [10].
The central mechanism through which cooperation is supported on single networks is
network reciprocity, or the formation of clusters of cooperators that avoid exploitation by
surrounding defectors [11–14]. Network reciprocity has been shown to increase on inter-
dependent networks for social dilemmas [15, 16], combinations of different games [17–19],
and in games where players’ fitness is defined as a weighted sum of their payoffs on each
layer [20–26]. On multiplex networks, cooperation is found to be increased [27–29] due to
“incoherent” players, who do not play the same strategy across all layers, generating a large
enough payoff through defection on some layer(s) to support cooperation on others.
Szolnoki and Perc [30] find that network reciprocity also supports conditional cooperators,
who decide to cooperate or defect dependent on others’ behaviour, along with the standard
binary ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’ strategies. Playing explicitly conditional strategies on lattices
they found that the conditional strategies shield cooperative clusters from exploitation by
free-riders, encouraging cooperation.
Despite network reciprocity providing a key mechanism for the support of cooperation,
evidence for it in human laboratory experiments is disputed [31–33]. The most likely ex-
4planation for the results in [33] is that some players act as moody conditional cooperators,
who are more likely to cooperate if their network neighbours also cooperate. Numerical
simulations by Gracia-La´zaro et al. [34] support this hypothesis.
Conditional cooperation can also take the form of continuous strategies, for example
where players can decide how much to donate to the public good from a continuous range.
Thus while cooperators donate all they have and defectors donate nothing independent of
others decisions, conditional cooperators can choose to donate some intermediate amount
depending on what others have donated. (Note that this contrasts with the moody condi-
tional cooperation reported in [33] and modelled in [34], where the conditional cooperators
have a binary choice either to donate all or to donate none, and it is only the choice of action
that depends on how others behave.) There exists a range of empirical evidence that suggest
individuals use these kinds of conditional strategies [35], and furthermore, that participants
from different backgrounds exhibit different frequencies of conditional cooperation within the
population [36–39]. In general, there are two factors that influence how cooperative players
are in the laboratory: the first being real-life experiences akin to the public goods game,
and the second membership of a group where cooperation is strongly enforced. Members of
groups that discourage free-riding in real life cooperate more in the laboratory.
Conditional strategies have been included in a number of models by mapping the group’s
contribution to the player’s by some linear factor. Guttman [40] found that dominant
strategies were not unconditional, but included a component that exactly matched group
donations in the public goods game. Zhang and Perc [41] represented strategies as a piecewise
linear function, finding that the dominant strategy is one that free-rides for low contributions
and conditionally cooperates for higher contributions, due to the competing influences of
inter- and intra-group competition. Continuous strategies have also been studied in [42].
Mechanisms other than network reciprocity, such as non-payoff-based strategy updates
can also lead to an increased prevalence of cooperation. Cimini and Sa´nchez [43] mod-
elled the evolution of moody conditional cooperation on a network numerically using both
payoff-dependent and non-payoff-dependent update rules, including the voter model and re-
inforcement learning. Interestingly, it is reinforcement learning that generates populations
with similar prevalence of cooperation to that observed in the laboratory. Other studies find
increased cooperation if certain subsections of the population blindly imitate neighbouring
strategies, disregarding their neighbour’s payoff either probabilistically [44] or at key points
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sidering both the payoff and the number of other players using a given strategy on a given
layer, and found that coordination of strategies only occurs when the payoffs are taken into
account.
Separating payoff- and non-payoff-based considerations has also been investigated on
multiplexes with separate layers representing payoff accumulation and strategy imitation.
Wang et al. [47] found reduced cooperation in a two-layer multiplex when one layer connects
nodes of similar degree and one layer connects high degree nodes with low degree ones. More
recently Amato et al. [48] investigated a model on a two-layer multiplex, where on one layer
a 2×2 matrix game is played, while the other acts as the opinion layer, on which it is assumed
that cooperation is encouraged. They find that the addition of the opinion layer leads to
either full cooperation across the multiplex or polarisation of cooperation and defection
across communities, depending on the parameters selected.
Inspired by the laboratory observations highlighting the relevance of conditional cooper-
ators and social influences [35–39], in this article we consider the two themes of conditional
cooperation and strategy updates that depend on a mix of economic and societal factors.
We investigate the tension between the economic and social influences on conditional coop-
erators by modelling the population as a set of individuals linked by a multiplex network and
playing a repeated version of the public goods game. Through this we seek to understand
the importance of social influence on conditional strategies, and the variation of conditional
strategies across the community.
The article is structured as follows: in section II we describe the details of the model.
Section III presents our results, where we establish the profound impact of both conditional
cooperation and societal pressures on levels of cooperation. Our findings support previous
empirical discoveries: the dominant factor in the preservation of cooperative strategies is
social influence, and this must be considered when modelling cooperation. We explain the
mechanisms by which cooperation is preserved by considering outcomes from simulations
where social influence either is or is not a factor, and investigate the robustness of our results
to the introduction of community structure. We conclude with a discussion in section IV.
6II. METHODS
In our model individuals play a public goods game (PGG), each player contributing con-
ditionally to the public good depending on what others have contributed. We divide each
generation of the game into two phases: firstly, a sequence of iterations of the conditional
PGG resulting in payoff accumulation, and secondly a strategy update phase that depends
on both economic factors and social influence. Players are linked by a multiplex network
consisting of two layers: one labelled ‘economic’ and the other ‘social’. Payoff accumulation
takes place on the economic layer, while both layers can play a part in strategy updates.
This structure enables us to vary the strength of economic and social interactions indepen-
dently. Consequently, for appropriate parameter settings, the model replicates results for
the standard PGG and also describes the conditional PGG both with and without social
influence.
Section II A describes the structure of the multiplex network. Sections II B and II C set
out the the rules for payoff accumulation and strategy updates respectively. Details of the
numerical simulations are given in II D.
A. Network structure
The players are placed on nodes in a multiplex Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network [49] consisting of two
layers: the economic layer (mean degree 〈kp〉) and the social layer (〈ks〉), with N nodes on
each layer. The economic layer defines those with whom each node plays the game to gain
a payoff. Each node plays in multiple groups: the group in which the node is focal and the
groups in which each of the node’s neighbours is focal. The social layer defines those whose
strategy the player knows, but does not necessarily play against. Each player is assumed
to know the strategy of those with whom it plays the game, and so the payoff network is
a subnetwork of the social network. The economic layer is first generated by forming edges
between nodes with probability 〈kp〉
N−1 . Because the economic layer is a subgraph of the social
layer, the economic layer is first replicated into the social layer. The social layer is then
completed by adding additional edges to each node on the social layer so that the final
degree distribution matches that expected of an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with mean degree
〈ks〉.
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During payoff accumulation, each player plays a public goods game that is repeated for
L iterations. In each iteration, players make donations based on their conditional strategy
and receive payoffs. Each player i has a strategy ai ≥ 0 which describes how conditionally
cooperative they are. Free-riders play strategy ai = 0 whilst very cooperative players play
strategies ai  0.
Each player has a maximum of one unit to donate in each group, and possible donations
range between zero and one. At each iteration l of the game, player i contributes
ci,g(l) =
aicg(l − 1) if cg(l − 1) <
1
ai
1 otherwise,
(1)
where cg(l) is the average contribution over all players in the group in iteration l. Critically,
the fact that ci,g(l) depends on cg(l−1) means that players typically do not donate the same
amount in every iteration, but instead donate an amount that is conditional on the level of
the group contribution in the previous iteration.
As in the standard public goods game, the payoff of player i is calculated by multiplying
the average group contribution (cg(l)) by an enhancement factor r, and subtracting the
amount donated by player i in that iteration:
pi,g(l) = r
ci,g(l) +
∑
j∈g,i6=j cj,g(l)
G
− ci,g(l) = rcg(l)− ci,g(l), (2)
where j ∈ g are the players in player i’s group, and G is the number of players in the group.
This process of payoff accumulation repeats for a single generation of L iterations. At the
beginning of a generation (l = 1) it is not known what each member of the group contributed
in the last iteration, and so the initial group contribution is set to cg(0) = 0.5. The minimum
generation length for a conditional game is therefore two. In the results we report below,
we set L = 2 since we find that our results are not strongly dependent on the value of L ≥ 2
(see Fig. A.2).
The total payoff Pi of player i is defined as the sum of their payoffs over the generation
length in each group in which they play the game:
Pi =
ki+1∑
g=1
L∑
l=1
pi,g(l), (3)
8where ki is the degree of node i and pi,g(l) is the payoff of player i playing in group g at
iteration l.
Note that if a player’s strategy ai is smaller than one, then over the generation their dona-
tions decrease, and conversely for a strategy higher than one donations increase. Therefore,
populations with an average strategy larger than one will donate large amounts, and popu-
lations with average strategy smaller than one will donate small amounts.
C. Strategy update rules
Following payoff accumulation players update their strategy using information from the
social layer with probability λ, or from the economic layer with probability 1 − λ. We call
λ the social influence strength.
Updates on the economic layer are designed to mimic a rational self-interest, and therefore
a player changes its strategy in an attempt to increase its payoff. Each player (i) in the
population selects a neighbour (j) in the economic network at random and compares payoffs
derived in the previous generation: if the payoff of the selected player is higher, player i
moves its strategy in the direction of player j by a factor θ (known from now on as the
imitation strength) and so the updated strategy is
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θH(Pj > Pi)(aj(t)− ai(t)) (4)
where t labels the generations and H(x) is the Heaviside step function. Updating on the
social layer is designed to mimic a player’s desire to adjust their behaviour towards the
average of the community. The average behaviour is represented as the mean of the strategies
of player i’s neighbours in the social network, and updates occur by moving the player’s
strategy towards the average of the neighbours’ strategies on the social layer, a¯i, such that
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− ai(t)), (5)
a rule that is similar to Deffuant opinion dynamics [50].
D. Numerical simulations
Our model extends the standard PGG on a network by including both conditional coop-
eration and social influence. We can tease apart the effect of conditional cooperation and
9social influence on cooperation by considering different parameter regimes. For example,
when λ = 0 only economic considerations are taken into account during strategy updates,
enabling us to study the effect of conditional cooperation alone. However, when λ = 1 only
social influence is important, and Deffuant-like opinion dynamics [50] are recovered. Simi-
larly when θ = 1 players copy each other exactly, and the standard PGG can be recovered
when λ = 0. Table I sets out each of the parameter regimes we will study and the conditions
that they describe.
Regime Social influence, λ Imitation strength, θ Initial conditions Plot colour
Conditional cooperation 0.1 0.9 Uniform, 0 ≤ ai ≤ 5 Red
and social influence
Conditional cooperation with 0 0.9 Uniform, 0 ≤ ai ≤ 5 Blue
economic considerations only
Standard PGG 0 1 Bimodal, ai ∈ {0, 5} Black
TABLE I: Parameter regimes for which numerical results are presented, defined in terms of
social influence and imitation strengths and initial strategy distributions. The colour used
for each regime in subsequent plots is also given.
Unless otherwise stated, in the results reported below, the number of nodes in each layer
is N = 500, and each run of the dynamics is for 20, 000 generations, or until the dynamics
have converged to a single strategy. Here we consider a population to have converged when
all members of the population share the same strategy. Due to the form of the strategy
imitation rules, and the lack of noise the population will not deviate from this value, and
so the simulations are stopped. The mean degree on the economic layer is 〈kp〉 = 4, and
the mean degree of the social layer is 〈ks〉 = 8. Unless otherwise stated each data point is
an average over 20 distinct, randomly initialised runs of the dynamics. Shading indicates a
single standard deviation from the mean over the 20 runs.
Two measures of cooperation are used. The first is the mean contribution averaged over
players, groups and iterations. If the amount donated by player i in iteration l to group g is
ci,g(l), then because a player with degree ki plays in ki + 1 groups, the average contribution
is
〈c〉 =
∑N
i=1
∑ki+1
m=1
1
ki+1
∑L
l=1 ci,gi,m(l)
LN
, (6)
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where gi,m is the m
th group containing player i. The second measure of cooperation is the
mean strategy in the population
〈a〉 =
∑N
i=1 ai
N
. (7)
In the simulations each measure is calculated as an average over the last 2000 generations
to give the final average mean contribution and strategy.
III. RESULTS
We present results from numerical simulations for each of the three regimes described in
table I, before exploiting the independence of conditional cooperation and social influence to
explain the effect of each in turn. In section III A we first illustrate that both conditional co-
operation and social influence dramatically increase cooperation at low enhancement factors
compared to the standard public goods game. The reasons for the increased cooperation due
to conditional strategies is investigated in section III B, before further examining the effect
of social influence in section III C. In section III D we consider network structures closer to
those described in empirical studies of cooperation in communities [35–39].
A. Comparing the effects of economic and social influences
Fig. 1a plots the mean contribution 〈c〉 against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1
for each of the three regimes described in table I.
As expected, in the standard public goods game (Fig. 1a, black triangles) contributions,
and hence cooperation, are maintained on the network at scaled enhancement factors above
η = 0.7 (as in [14]). In contrast, with the introduction of conditional cooperation, (blue
circles), cooperation occurs above η = 0.2, whilst the introduction of social influence results
in large contributions for enhancement factors as low as η = 0.05 (red diamonds).
The differences between the three sets of results are caused by the differences in mean
strategies at each enhancement factor, as shown in Fig. 1b. The larger strategies at low
enhancement factors for λ = 0.1 confirm that the inclusion of social influence increases
cooperative strategies within the population.
Note that for λ = 0 and λ = 0.1, the points where there is rapid change in mean
contribution all occur when the mean strategy is close to the the critical value 〈a〉 = 1. As
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FIG. 1: The mean contribution (a) and strategy (b) plotted against the scaled
enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for conditional cooperators on the multiplex: economic layer
only (λ = 0, red diamonds) and two-layer multiplex with social influence strength λ = 0.1
(blue circles). Here, the mean degree on the economic layer is 〈kp〉 = 4 and on the social
layer is 〈ks〉 = 8; and imitation strength θ = 0.1. Also plotted are results for the standard
public goods game (black triangles).
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highlighted in section II B, for strategies ai > 1 donations increase over the game iterations,
whilst the converse is true for ai < 1, and in general, large mean group strategies result in
larger contributions. Consequently, in the neighbourhood of 〈a〉 = 1, a small difference in
mean strategy results in a large difference in mean contribution. A striking feature of the
λ = 0.1 results is the dip in cooperation at η ≈ 0.2, a result we explain in section III C.
It is important to note that in Figs. 1a and 1b the probability of strategy update through
the social layer is only λ = 0.1, so the influence of the social behaviour is relatively small.
Yet even this low level of influence has a dramatic effect on the amount of cooperation in
the system. We confirm the dominance of social influence, varying the generation length
and mean social network degree, and finding that neither appears to have much impact on
the effect of social influence (appendix A.1, Figs. 7 and 8).
Fig. 2 shows that social influence has an equally dramatic effect on cooperation for two
other possible social imitation rules: either targeting the median of the group, or selecting a
random social neighbour’s strategy (essentially the voter model [50]). The latter is similar
to the way in which updates are performed on the economic layer, but on the social layer
the payoff of the randomly selected neighbour is not taken into consideration. We observe
that which social imitation rule is chosen makes little difference to the mean strategy within
the population. Due to the small groups and random initial conditions this is not surprising
for the mean and the median rules. However, the fact that on a structured population
selecting a neighbour at random on the social layer and blindly imitating it gives the same
results as imitating the mean of the social neighbours is interesting. It suggests that it is
the separation of strategy imitation from payoff comparison that is important rather than
the selection of a particular social imitation rule. We also observe that at low enhancement
factors, payoff comparison favours the lowest possible strategy value of zero, and so any
non-payoff based imitation rule increases the mean population strategy.
B. Isolating the effect of conditional cooperation: restriction to the economic layer
(λ = 0)
As discussed in II D, a measure of the level of cooperation is the mean strategy in the
population. In this section we show that the two key factors in determining the strategies at
equilibrium are the initial distribution and the enhancement factor. In order to demonstrate
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FIG. 2: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex, for three different social imitation rules:
targetting the mean of the social neighbourhood (blue circles), targetting the median (red
diamonds) and imitation of a random member of the social neighbourhood (black triangles)
this clearly we remove any network effects and consider a well-mixed population initialised
with just two strategies, ai(0) ∈ {a0(0), a1(0)}, where aw(0) defines one of two possible
strategies that player i may take. As players update their strategies by moving towards that
of a better performing player (Eq. 4), we can approximate the subsequent dynamics of the
distribution of strategies as two distinct strategies moving towards each other, eventually
coalescing at an equilibrium strategy determined by the relative rates of strategy imitation.
These rates are defined by the probability that a player with strategy av imitates another
player with strategy aw, that is the probability that the total payoff to player w, Pw, is larger
than the total payoff to player v, Pv, defined as Qvw. Under the above assumptions using
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a mean-field approximation we find that the equilibrium strategy 〈a〉(t) as t→∞ depends
on the difference in value of the initial strategies ∆a(0), and the ratio of the probabilities of
each strategy imitating the other
lim
t→∞
〈a〉(t) = a0(0) + ∆a(0)
1 +Q10/Q01
, (8)
where a0(0) is the initial value of the smaller strategy. The derivation of this result is given
in Appendix A.5.
The importance of the initial strategy distribution is clearly demonstrated by the presence
of a0(0) and ∆a(0) in Eq. (8). However, the key to understanding the dynamics of the
conditional game is the function Qvw, which depends on the number of possible group
compositions where Pw > Pv. Due to the form of the public goods game (Eq. (2)), at
larger enhancement factors there is a larger number of group compositions in which a more
cooperative player gains a higher payoff than in which a less cooperative one does. (See
section A.3 for further details.) Hence Q01 is increased and Q10 is decreased, and therefore
according to Eq. (8) increased enhancement factors lead to larger equilibrium strategies.
We further apply the above arguments to explain why conditional cooperation increases
cooperation in comparison to the standard PGG. In the conditional game cooperative strate-
gies are less easily exploited, and so the number of cooperative strategies needed in a group
for cooperation to flourish at each enhancement factor is lower, leading to higher frequencies
of cooperation in the conditional game in comparison to the standard PGG (as observed in
Fig. 1b).
Returning to the conditional cooperator game on a network, it is the relative probabilities
of one strategy imitating another, along with network reciprocity that explain the results in
the absence of social influence (λ = 0). (See the appendix for further details.)
C. The effect of social influence (λ = 0.1)
We now explain the difference in cooperation between parameter regimes (Fig. 1b) by
considering the combination of the mean strategies on the two layers. Taking each layer
separately, the dynamics on the social layer attract the population towards the initial mean
strategy, owing to the Deffuant-like strategy update rule (Eq. (5)), whereas updating strate-
gies on the economic layer shifts them towards a value dependent on the enhancement factor.
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Competition between the dynamics on the two layers results in the equilibrium mean strat-
egy observed for each value of λ.
At each enhancement factor in Fig. 1b the initial population mean strategy (〈a〉(0) = 2.5)
is higher than the equilibrium strategy found by the economic layer dynamics alone. Thus
at low enhancement factors the introduction of social pressure increases the mean strategy
above one, and so the contribution to the public good is dramatically increased. This
effect is less pronounced for higher enhancement factors because the difference between the
equilibrium strategies with and without social influence is reduced, and at some enhancement
factors the equilibrium strategy without social influence is higher. We illustrate this effect
by plotting strategy distributions for a single run of the dynamics in Fig. 3, where we
observe that for dynamics where social influence is included (λ = 0.1, red histogram) the
mean strategy is closer to the initial population mean and the strategy distribution is much
narrower than for λ = 0.
The differing equilbrium strategies on the two layers also explain the split in behaviour
of the mean strategy above and below η = 0.2 (Figs. 1b, 2, 4b, 7 and 8). Eq (A.17) in
section A.4 shows that the critical enhancement factor above which any positive strategy
performs better than a free-rider in direct competition is ηc = 0.2. Above this enhancement
factor, previous arguments that the mean strategy is a combination of economic and social
equilbrium strategies hold. However, below it the equilibrium strategy on the economic layer
is decoupled from the enhancement factor (as the equilibrium strategy on the economic layer
is zero for all η < 0.2). Furthermore, at enhancement factor η = 0, payoffs on the economic
layer are given by the negative of the player’s contribution (2). Owing to the distribution
of initial strategies many players contribute c = 1 initially, so there is no difference between
them in economic payoff and thus social influence dominates strategy imitation halting the
slide to free-riding that would otherwise occur. As the enhancement factor increases from
zero, the economic payoff gradually becomes more strongly coupled to strategy through the
increasing importance of the group contribution (Eq. (2)), and so the overall equilibrium
strategy is attracted towards the economic equilibrium strategy.
The importance of social influence in shifting the mean strategy towards the initial popu-
lation mean is further supported by comparing results for a smaller range of initial strategies
with a lower initial mean (uniform distribution, 0 < ai < 2, Fig. 4), with the results in Fig. 1a
(uniform distribution, 0 < ai < 5).
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FIG. 3: The distribution of strategies after t = 1000 generations. Plotted from a single run
of the dynamics updating using the economic layer only (λ = 0, blue line) and social
influence (λ = 0.1, red line) for enhancement factor η = 0.3, mean economic degree
〈kp〉 = 4 and mean social degree 〈ks〉 = 8.
Comparing the contribution for the high and low mean initial distributions (Figs. 1a
and 4a respectively) the mean contribution for low mean initial conditions is lower for all
enhancement factors compared to the high mean initial conditions. As might be expected,
social influence slightly depresses the mean strategy and consequent contributions at high
enhancement factors for the low mean initial conditions, because it entrenches the impact of
initial strategies that are lower on average than the purely economic equilibrium strategy for
higher enhancement factors. The lower mean strategies and cooperation in Fig. 4 compared
to Fig. 1 confirm the importance of the initial distribution of strategies, as also observed in
Eq. (8).
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FIG. 4: The mean contribution (a) and strategy (b) plotted against the scaled
enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean
strategy is compared for the economic layer only (λ = 0, blue circles) and the two-layer
multiplex with social influence strength λ = 0.1 (red diamonds), with initial strategies
selected at random from a unifom distribution 0 < ai < 2. The dynamics are run for mean
degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer, and imitation
strength θ = 0.1.
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D. The effect of community structure
In this section we study the behaviour of the model on a network designed to resemble
the populations observed in empirical investigations [35–39]. These communities tend to be
small, with a large number of connections between people and so we use the block network
[51] structure to model them. We first create the economic layer by building a number of
complete networks, or ‘communities’. Edges between nodes in different communities are
formed on the economic layer with probability pBR = pe ∀B,R where B and R label the
communities. The social layer is a replica of the economic layer. An example of the economic
network used in this section is shown in Fig. 5.
We run our model dynamics on a community network, and find that for disconnected
communities the distribution of strategies mimics those observed in the empirical studies.
The economic network consists of N = 40 nodes divided at random into six economic com-
munities, with community sizes selected at random, whilst ensuring that each community
has at least two members. To understand the effect of the community network structure,
we compare the strategy distribution on the community networks with that on a random
network. We generate Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks of an equal size and mean degree as the com-
munity networks (〈kp〉=7.3 for pe = 0 and 〈kp〉=7.9 for pe = 0.01). Mean degrees were
calculated by averaging the mean network degree across 100 community networks. We plot
the distribution of final strategies for 100 runs of the dynamics for both the community
and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks in Fig. 6. The dynamics are run for 5000 generations with an
initial group contribution of cg(0) = 0.5. Strategies are selected from a uniform distribution
0 ≤ ai ≤ 5, the enhancement factor is η = 0.5, the social influence strength is λ = 0.1, and
the mean strategy is averaged over the last 500 generations.
Figure 6 shows that the model dynamics in this community structure result in a wide
distribution of strategies, and in both Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b the strategies found on the
community networks are lower than those on random ones.
When no edges are formed between communities (pe = 0, green line in Fig. 6a) strategies
range between approximately 0 and 2, mimicking results found in [35–39], where strategies
tend to vary from free-riding to conditionally cooperative, with a few players that donate
more than the group average at each iteration.
The low strategies in the community networks in Fig. 6a are explained by considering the
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FIG. 5: An example of the network of communities. Here the probability of forming an
edge between nodes not in the same community is pe = 0.01.
behaviour of a single community on the economic layer. The community is a fully connected
network, so each individual gains the same from the public good, cg. However, players with
larger strategies donate more, thereby lowering their payoff (see Eq. 2). Updates on the
economic layer therefore tend to the lowest strategy in the community. Since strategies
are initialised randomly, the lowest strategy is not necessarily zero and so strictly positive
strategies are observed. Based on our results in section III C we expect that social influence
is also helping to maintain strategies at a higher level than they would be in its absence.
On the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network players donate to multiple groups of different sizes, reducing
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FIG. 6: The cumulative distribution of strategies on community networks after 5000
generations for 100 runs of the dynamics, with updates with no inter-community edges (a,
pe = 0) and with inter-community edges (b, pe = 0.01). Initial strategies are distributed
uniformly on the interval [0,5]. The enhancement factor is η = 0.5, the social influence is
λ = 0.1 and the initial group contribution is cg(0) = 0.5.
the strict relationship of a low strategy to a high payoff, and thereby preserving larger
strategies than in the community networks. The same effect, but to a lesser extent, causes
the observed strategy increase on community networks between pe = 0 and pe = 0.01 (the
green lines in Figs. 6a and 6b respectively).
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have introduced a model inspired by a number of empirical observations of human
cooperation in the real world. We sought to understand how non-payoff based imitation
alters cooperation in the conditional public goods game, and whether non-payoff based rules
could account for the variation in conditional cooperation observed within communities.
Both conditional cooperation and social influence on strategy updates can have a con-
siderable effect on the amount contributed to the public good, even when social influence
operates as little as 10% of the time. Similar effects are observed for a range of social imita-
tion rules, suggesting that it is the decoupling of imitation dynamics from economic payoffs
that is important rather than the particular choice of social imitation rule.
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Conditional cooperation increases contributions compared to the standard public goods
game through two mechanisms: the resilience of conditional strategies to free-riding; and
network reciprocity.
In general, social influence in the conditional public goods game homogenises the final
distribution of strategies across the population. This homogenisation is very strong, and
remains unaffected by changes in the social network degree, or the number of game iterations.
Whether social influence leads to an increase in cooperation is heavily dependent on the
initial strategies in the population. If strategies are initially highly cooperative on average,
then social influence will increase cooperation in the system at very low enhancement factors.
However, if initial strategies are insufficiently cooperative, then social updates do not affect
the amount donated greatly at low enhancement factors, and can decrease contributions at
high enhancement factors. One possible reason for the sensitivity to the initial conditions
may be that global dynamics are sensitive to local arrangements of particular strategies.
However, we do not believe this is the case for two reasons: the variation in mean strategies
and contributions in Fig. 1 are small between each randomly initialised run; and preliminary
investigations of additional noise (not included) result in little change in the mean strategy
for reasonable values of noise.
Since the least cooperative strategy in the public goods game, namely free-riding, is the
most economically advantageous at low enhancement factors, we emphasise that any social
influence rule that does not favour free-riding will result in more cooperative strategies at
low enhancement factors than evolve under purely economic considerations. This may be
relevant to the finding of a review of empirical studies comparing the efficacy of economic
and social interventions aimed at increasing cooperative behaviour, that social interventions
prove more successful [52].
Our findings lend support to other studies showing that conditional cooperation in the
public goods game leads to an increase in overall cooperation, that players evolve to play
conditionally [40, 41], and that an update rule that does not take the payoff into account
results in more cooperative strategies [34, 44, 53]. We have extended these results by study-
ing conditional strategies on networked populations, and considering empirically motivated
strategies within the context of non-payoff based update rules on the multiplex. In con-
trast to [48], in our model there is no need to explicitly encourage cooperation on the social
layer in order to mimic the cooperation found in the real world. The results presented are
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also supported by previous theoretical work [54–56], demonstrating that non-payoff based,
asymmetric imitation rules result in larger frequencies of cooperation.
We have also studied networks designed to resemble the structure of real communities that
manage renewable resources described in a number of empirical studies. When our model
dynamics are run on such community networks the final distribution of strategies mimic
those observed in real-life communities, ranging from free-riding to conditional cooperation.
We were motivated to understand the variation of conditional cooperation across real
communities. However, within our model there is no penalty for an entire community that
chooses to free-ride, i.e. there is no minimum payoff required for survival, no minimum
resource that must be harvested. To make our model more realistic in this respect, we
could extend it to include a minimum payoff threshold for survival. Our work could also be
extended to investigate the importance of social influence on more complex strategies, such
as the piecewise linear responses to group contributions studied in [41].
We conclude that social influence should be taken into account when modelling coopera-
tion in social systems. In our model social influence leads to a large increase in cooperation,
as long as cooperative individuals are already present in the population. Thus any interven-
tion to increase cooperation should take account of existing social norms in the population,
and the current prevalence of cooperative behaviour, rather than attempt to increase coop-
eration purely through economic incentives.
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FIG. 7: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared for different
degrees on each layer (〈ks〉 = 8, 〈kp〉 = 4, blue circles) and equal degrees (〈ks〉 = 〈kp〉 = 4,
red diamonds).
APPENDIX
A.1. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR VARYING GENERATION LENGTH AND
MEAN SOCIAL NETWORK DEGREE
We compare results for different generation lengths (L) and different mean degrees on
the social network (〈ks〉). Figure 7 compares two different mean degrees on the social layer
(〈ks〉 = 8 and 〈ks〉 = 4), whilst figure 8 compares two different generation lengths (L = 10
and L = 2). The mean strategy is plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1
for conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The number of nodes is N = 500.
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FIG. 8: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared for long
generation lengths (L = 10, red diamonds) and short generation lengths (L = 2, blue
circles).
A.2. CALCULATION OF THE PAYOFF
We show how to calculate analytically the total payoff over a single generation in a single
group for small donations. For sufficiently small initial contributions cg(0) players always
donate less than one. Recall from Eq. (2) that player i, with strategy ai calculates their
payoff from group g in iteration l of the game as
pi,g(l) = rcg(l)− ci,g(l), (A.1)
where cg(l) is the group contribution at this iteration and ci,g(l) is player i’s contribution
to this group. When players only contribute conditionally the contribution in group g with
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size G at iteration l is then
cg(l) =
∑
i∈g aicg(l − 1)
G
= agcg(l − 1), (A.2)
where ag =
1
G
∑
i∈g ai, and as long as cg(0) < 1 for all l the group mean contributions are
therefore given by
cg(l) = a
l
gcg(0). (A.3)
The payoff at each iteration is thus
pi,g(l) = ra
l
gcg(0)− ci,g(l) (A.4)
= ralgcg(0)− aial−1g cg(0) (A.5)
= cg(0)a
l−1
g (rag − ai) , (A.6)
and the total payoff for player i over a generation is
Pi,g =
2∑
l=1
cg(0)a
l−1
g (rag − ai) (A.7)
= cg(0)
(
1− a2g
1− ag
)
(rag − ai) (A.8)
= cg(0) (1 + ag) (rag − ai) . (A.9)
A.3. PROBABILITY OF ONE STRATEGY IMITATING ANOTHER
We calculate the probability of one strategy imitating another in a population where each
player plays one of two strategies a0 or a1 (as defined in section III B). Player i with strategy
a0 imitates player j with strategy a1 if Pj is greater than Pi, and using Eq. (A.9) this occurs
when
(A.10)
(
1 +
n1a
0 + (G− 1− n1)a1 + a1
G
)(
r
n1a
0 + (G− 1− n1)a1 + a1
G
− a1
)
>
(
1 +
n0a
0 + (G− 1− n0)a1 + a0
G
)(
r
n0a
0 + (G− 1− n0)a1 + a0
G
− a0
)
where r is the enhancement factor and n0 and n1 are the numbers of a
0 strategies in players
i and j’s groups respectively. Both groups are of size G. This condition can be written
(A.11)f(a1, a0, n1, n0) > 0,
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where
f(a1, a0, n1, n0) = (G+ n1a
0 + (G− 1− n1)a1 + a1)(r(n1a0 + (G− 1− n1)a1 + a1)−Ga1)
− (G+ n0a0 + (G− 1− n0)a1 + a0)(r(n0a0 + (G− 1− n0)a1 + a0)−Ga0).
(A.12)
The probability that a player with strategy a0 imitates a randomly selected player with
strategy a1 is the probability of selecting a player with strategy a1 multiplied by the proba-
bility that the selected player has a larger payoff, or
Q01 = ρ1
G−1∑
n0=0
G−1∑
n1=0
q(n0)q(n1)H(f(a
1, a0, n1, n0)) (A.13)
where again H(x) is the Heaviside step function and q(n) is the probability of a group
forming with n strategy a0 players in the rest of the group. As the rest of the group is
formed at random from a bimodal distribution in the well-mixed case
q(n) =
(
G− 1
n
)
ρn0 (1− ρ0)G−1−n, (A.14)
where ρ0 is the density (fraction) of strategy a
0 players in the population.
A similar calculation can be made to determine Q10, the probability that a player with
strategy a1 imitates a randomly selected player with strategy a0.
A.4. CRITICAL ENHANCEMENT FACTOR
The minimum enhancement factor, ηc =
rc
G
, at which positive strategies generate higher
payoffs than free-riders is the enhancement factor at which the minimum payoff of a strategy
a1 player is larger than the maximum payoff of an a0 = 0 player. The maximum possible
payoff is when all other group members play strategy a1, whilst the minimum is when all
other players play a0. Therefore from Eq. (A.12) we have
f(a1, 0, G− 1, 0) = (G+ (G− 1)a1 + a1)(r((G− 1)a1 + a1)−Ga1)
− (G+ (G− 1− (G− 1))a1)(r((G− 1− (G− 1))a1)) (A.15)
= G2a1(1 + a1)(r − 1). (A.16)
The critical enhancement factor occurs when f(a1, 0, G−1, 0) = 0, or rc = 1, and therefore
ηc =
1
G
(A.17)
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A.5. EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY IN A WELL-MIXED BIMODAL
POPULATION
We derive an expression for the mean strategy at equilibrium in a well-mixed bimodal
population in terms of the probability of strategy av imitating strategy aw, Qvw(t), and
demonstrate that this is determined by the initial strategies and the rate at which each of
the bimodal peaks approaches the other. We assume that the probability of one strategy
imitating the other remains constant across generations for both strategies so that Qvw(t) =
Qvw(0) = Qvw, and use this to calculate the equilibrium strategy 〈a〉 as t → ∞. Treating
each strategy as independent and coherent, and using Eq. (4) the updated strategy in
generation t+ 1 is given by
av(t+ 1) = av(t) + θQvw(t)(a
w(t)− av(t)). (A.18)
Thus the expected mean strategy of a population consisting of two strategies a0 and a1
evolves according to
〈a〉(t+ 1) = ρ0a0(t+ 1) + ρ1a1(t+ 1) (A.19)
= 〈a〉(t) + θ(a1(t)− a0(t))(ρ0Q01(t)− ρ1Q10(t)), (A.20)
where ρ0 and ρ1 are the fractions of the population playing strategies a
0 and a1 respectively.
The difference between two strategies a1(t) and a0(t) in the next genetation is
a1(t+ 1)− a0(t+ 1) = a1(t)− a0(t) + θQ10(a0(t)− a1(t))− θQ01(a1(t)− a0(t)) (A.21)
= (a1(t)− a0(t)) (1− θQ10 − θQ01) (A.22)
and substituting ∆a(t) = a1(t)− a0(t) gives
∆a(t+ 1) = ∆a(t) (1− θQ10 − θQ01) . (A.23)
Writing
β = 1− θQ10 − θQ01 (A.24)
we have
∆a(1) = β∆a(0), (A.25)
which by induction gives
∆a(t) = βt∆a(0). (A.26)
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Using ρ0 + ρ1 = 1, this gives the mean strategy as
〈a〉(t+ 1) = ρ0a0(t) + ρ1a1(t) + θ(a1(t)− a0(t))(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10) (A.27)
= a0(t) + ∆a(t)(ρ1 + θ(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10)) (A.28)
Substituting Eq. (A.26) and letting γ = ρ1 + θ(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10) gives
〈a〉(t+ 1) = a0(t) + βt∆a(0)γ. (A.29)
We rewrite Eq. (A.18) to give
a0(t+ 1) = a0(t) + θQ01∆a(t) (A.30)
= a0(t) + δ∆a(t), (A.31)
where δ = θQ01. The value of the smaller strategy after one generation is then
a0(1) = a0(0) + δ∆a(0), (A.32)
and therefore after t generations is
a0(t) = a0(0) + δ∆a(0)(1 + β + β2 + ...+ βt−1) (A.33)
= a0(0) + δ∆a(0)
(
1− βt
1− β
)
. (A.34)
We combine this with Eq. (A.29) to give
〈a〉(t+ 1) = a0(0) + δ∆a(0)
(
1− βt
1− β
)
+ βt∆s(0)γ. (A.35)
Since we have θ > 0, 0 < Qvw < ρw and ρ0 + ρ1 = 1, then from Eq. (A.24) we must also
have 0 < β < 1, and so we find
〈a〉(∞) = lim
t→∞
〈a〉(t) = a0(0) + δ∆a(0)
1− β . (A.36)
Substituting β and δ as defined above into this Eq. gives
〈a〉(∞) = a0(0) + θQ01∆a(0)
1− (1− θQ10 − θQ01) (A.37)
= a0(0) +
∆a(0)
1 +Q10/Q01
(A.38)
From this equation we see that the final equilibrium mean strategy depends on the ratio of
the probabilities of each strategy imitating the other, and the initial strategies.
We confirm that Eq. (A.38) is a good fit by plotting the mean strategy at equilibrium,
for both numerics and Eq. (A.38), against the scaled enhancement factor η in figure 9. Once
again the initial strategies are a1(0) = 5 and a0(0) = 0.
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FIG. 9: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η with bimodal
initial conditions a0(0) = 0 and a1(1) = 5 for numerics (single points) and analytics (dashed
lines from Eq. (A.38)). The imitation strength is θ = 0.1 and the group size is G = 5.
A.6. NETWORK RECIPROCITY
Network reciprocity is confirmed by plotting the strategy of each player against the mean
strategy of the player’s neighbours (Fig. 10). Strategy segregation (network reciprocity)
does indeed emerge over time: at early times (Fig. 10, top row) the player and neighbour
strategies are not strongly correlated, and many of the extreme strategies have not changed.
After t = 50 generations, however, a very strong correlation between a player’s strategy and
that of its neighbours emerges (bottom rows), with correlation coefficient 0.71 for η = 0.5.
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FIG. 10: The mean strategy of a node’s neighbours plotted against that node’s strategy in
the network for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.5. Plots are for figure a) at generation
t = 1 with Pearson correlation coefficient between the node’s strategy and the mean
strategy of its nearest neighbours 0.15, b) at generation t = 10 with correlation 0.51, c) at
generation t = 50 with correlation 0.71 and d) at generation t = 500 with correlation 0.75.
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